There are a few exceptions to the requirement to take into account. In the common law, the old one does not count, but in these cases, no consideration is necessary: if a prescribed promise is revived, if a void obligation is asserted, if a promise is negatively based on a promise (i.e. it is a promise) or if a court simply finds that the lender has a moral obligation to keep the promise. A promise can be implemented if it is supported by a quid pro quo, that is, where the reflection has deviated from the promise. In the case of Tweddle v Atkinson, john Tweddle William Guy, for example, promised that he would pay money to William Guy`s child, and William Guy also promised John Tweddle that he would pay money to John Tweddle`s child after the marriage of the two children. William Guy did not pay John Tweddle`s son, who then sued his executors for the promised amount. It was found that the son could not keep the promise made to his father, because he himself had not really thought about it – it was his father who had done it instead. The son has not received any consideration, so he cannot keep the promise. This particular rule of reflection forms the basis for teaching the privilege of a contract, i.e. only one contracting party can complain about the contractual terms of this treaty.
(Note that the doctrine of privity was somewhat amended by the Third Party Rights Act in 1999). Therefore, the consideration of the promise was lenient on the application. While reflection must move away from promise, it does not necessarily have to move to promise. The commitment can be taken into account by a third party if it is agreed at the time of the contract.  Promissory estoppel is just (often called “equitable estoppel”) and works if it were unfair if the promisor was not kept to the promise – the modern doctrine developed by the Von Denning LJ judgment. The additional factor is taken into account.